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• Planning in the competitive environment
• Centralized and decentralized transmission investment 
formulations
• Investment incentives in decentralized planning : the 
investment game
• Illustrative case study
• Concluding remarks
• Future work
OBJECTIVES
• Incentive mechanism design for transmission network 
investment
• Cooperative game theory framework (Shapley value) to 
allocate payments to investors
• Payments based on added social welfare
• Compare decentralized and centralized transmission 
investment settings
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PLANNING  UNDER  COMPETITION
• Major shift in the planning paradigm
– cessation of the centralized integrated planning of the 
past
– role of regional planning under the independent grid 
operator
– unclear responsibility for implementation under the 
ownership/control separation
– role of decentralized decision making
PLANNING  UNDER  COMPETITION
• Planning, to the extent it is performed in the new environment, 
is an asset management problem
– investment under uncertainty
– critical importance of effective risk management 
– subject to regulations in a continuous state of flux
CENTRALIZED TRANSMISSION  INVESTMENT 
FORMULATION
• Maximize :
– aggregate social welfare – investment costs 
subject to :
– power flow balance equations
– line flow equations
– generator and demand limits
– line flow limits
– budget constraints to build lines
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CENTRALIZED TRANSMISSION  INVESTMENT 
FORMULATION
The solution of the problem determines:
• social welfare
• amounts sold and bought by the pool players
• new lines to be built
• cost of investment in new lines
DECENTRALIZED TRANSMISSION  
INVESTMENT FORMULATION
• Maximize :
– aggregate social welfare
subject to :
– power flow balance equations
– line flow equations
– generator and demand limits
– line flow limits
– budget constraints to pay investors
DECENTRALIZED TRANSMISSION  
INVESTMENT FORMULATION
The solution of the problem determines:
• social welfare
• amounts  sold and bought by the pool players
• new lines to be built
• payments to the line investors
DECENTRALIZED INVESTMENT INCENTIVES : 
THE INVESTMENT GAME
• The transmission planner (TP) needs to send incentives to the investors so 
that they maximize social welfare
• Value of a transmission asset for the system : increase in social welfare that 
the asset produces
• Bargaining process between the planner and the investors :
– TP objective : increase social welfare
– Investors’ objective : specific Rate of Return (RoR)
DECENTRALIZED INVESTMENT INCENTIVES : 
THE INVESTMENT GAME
• The TP uses the Shapley value to calculate the individual 
investor contribution to the increase in social welfare
• Cooperative bargaining game :
– TP : offers payments to investors based on social welfare increase 
calculated by the Shapley value
– Players : investors accept / reject the offer compared to their RoR
DECENTRALIZED INVESTMENT INCENTIVES : 
THE INVESTMENT GAME
• Investment game defined by a pair (Y,ΔSW) :
– Y = set of all the investors
– ΔSW = increase in social welfare
– Shapley value allocation per investor
DECENTRALIZED INVESTMENT INCENTIVES : 
THE INVESTMENT GAME
• Shapley value : SV
– It is one “fair” way to distribute the total gains to the players, 
assuming that they form coalitions
– IF the coalition being formed one player at a time, with each 
player demanding their contribution as a fair compensation 
– THEN the SV is the average over the possible different 
permutations in which the coalition can be formed
DECENTRALIZED INVESTMENT INCENTIVES : 
THE INVESTMENT GAME
• Shapley value axioms :
– The set of players receives all the resources available 
– A player that does not add value receives nothing
– The value assigned to a player does not depend on the 
position in the set of players of a coalition
– The SV is an additive function
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DECENTRALIZED INVESTMENT INCENTIVES : 
THE INVESTMENT GAME
DECENTRALIZED INVESTMENT INCENTIVES : 
THE INVESTMENT GAME
• Step 1 : The transmission planner (TP) selects the initial set of 
investors
• Step 2 : The TP calculates the increase in social welfare (ΔSW) 
per combination and makes payment offers to investors
• Step 3 : The TP verifies the investors that accept the offers
• Step 4 : The game ends if there are no new investors willing to 
build more transmission assets
CASE STUDY : GARVER’S 6-BUS NETWORK
• Garver 6-bus system
• 3 generators and 5 loads
• 25 years of operating life
• 10% interest rate and 5% rate of return
• 3 parallel lines can be built per corridor
• Marginal offers and bids
 
bus 1bus 5 
bus 3
bus 6 bus 4
bus 2 
150
360
600 
160
240 
80
40
240 
CASE STUDY : GARVER’S 6-BUS NETWORK
 
bus 1bus 5
bus 3
bus 6 bus 4
bus 2
OFFER  PARAMETERS
MW
$/MWh
generator
offer
ai
bi
BID  PARAMETERS
MW
$/MWh
demand
bidcj
dj
EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN CENTRALIZED AND 
DECENTRALIZED FORMULATIONS
• The centralized and decentralized solutions are 
equivalent in terms of social welfare if :
–The payments are equal to the actual costs
–The decentralized budget limit is equal to the 
optimal investment cost of the centralized 
problem
DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
• Decentralized investment models with no budget 
constraints produce more candidate lines
• Higher rates of return reduce the number of 
candidate lines
• Allowing more investors produces more 
competitive results
• Cost-based budget constraints in decentralized 
models produce similar results to centralized 
investment models
CONCLUDING  REMARKS
• Scheme for the incentivizing of transmission 
asset investments
• Two models of investment, centralized and 
decentralized, are compared
• Incentives based on Shapley value allocation
• Effects of rate of return and budget constraints
• Equivalence between the two models
FUTURE  WORK
• Combination of generation and transmission 
investments
• Modeling of uncertainty : 
– Change in load patterns
– Change in bidding patterns
– Entrance or exit of market players
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